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Abstract—The nature of Systems of Systems (SoSs), large
complex systems composed of independent, geographically dis-
tributed and continuously evolving constituent systems, means
that faults are unavoidable. Previous work on defining contractual
specifications of the constituent systems within SoSs does not
provide any explicit consideration for faults. In this paper we
address that gap by extending an existing pattern for modelling
contracts with fault modelling concepts. The proposed extensions
are introduced with respect to an Audio Visual SoS case study
from Bang & Olufsen, before discussing how they relate to
previous work on modelling faults in SoSs.
Keywords – systems of systems, modelling, architectural
frameworks, contracts, faults.
I. INTRODUCTION
Systems of Systems (SoSs) are an active area of research
due to the complexity that is present as a consequence of
several characteristics common to SoSs [1]; including: the
independence of the constituent systems (CSs) making up an
SoS, the distribution of CSs, the evolution and reconfiguration
of an SoS, and the emergent behaviours of an SoS. In addition
to these characteristics (and conceivably due to them), Kopetz
states that faults – considered exceptional in traditional mono-
lithic systems – are normal and to be expected in SoSs [2].
We therefore need methods to assist in understanding and
designing for faults in SoSs.
The job of the SoS integrator is to integrate “disparate inde-
pendent [constituent] systems up to an interoperable formation
of systems” and it is often a “complex, risky, long, and frus-
trating effort” [3]. This is due in large part to “emergence”: a
natural feature of SoS [4]. We define emergence in accordance
with Nielsen et al. as “the behaviours that arise as a result
of the synergistic collaboration of constituent [systems]” [5].
Emergence may be desired or undesired: the SoS integration
must produce the desired emergent behaviour while preventing
undesired emergent behaviour within the SoS. Commonly CSs
are not under the control of the SoS integrator, and thus we
propose a contractual description of these CSs that captures
their external behaviour [6], [7].
In this work, a contractual description (or contract) defines
the behaviour of a CS in terms of its functionality and ordering
of events. Currently, however, contracts contain no support for
explicitly recording and dealing with faults. Here we extend the
definition of contracts to enable the explicit recording of faults
and fault tolerance in SoSs. We do this by building on two
existing pieces of work: on contracts and on fault modelling.
We envisage these extensions being used by two groups:
CS designers and SoS integrators. The designer of a CS (or
its contract) may identify and acknowledge any deviations
from desired behaviour of CSs. They may also state any such
deviations from their environment (for example from other
CSs in the SoS) that they mitigate. These extended contract
definitions may be used by the SoS integrator as inputs to
the integration process. The SoS integrator may also observe
deviations of the CSs not under their control, and wish to
mitigate them. Fault modelling techniques can be applied that
explicitly state what deviations may be present in the CSs of
the SoS, and identify those CSs that may be affected by or
mitigate those deviations.
In this paper, we propose extensions to an existing method
for defining contracts; providing traceable fault modelling
techniques to understand the effects of faults in contracts.
This allows: (i) CS designers to annotate their CS contracts
with failure modes and fault masking capabilities; (ii) SoS
integrators to describe faults identified in the CSs; and (iii) SoS
integrators to define the means to recover from, or mitigate,
the effects of SoS faults.
In Section II we go into more detail on relevant background
on modelling contracts and faults before describing related
work in Section III. In Section IV we propose extensions to the
Contract Pattern to include faults. These extensions are elicited
using an Audio Visual SoS case study. We discuss how the
extended contract pattern relates to our previous work on fault
modelling in Section V. Further work and our conclusions are
presented in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
Our work builds on the established field of design pat-
terns. Such patterns were originally conceived for designing
buildings [8]; their usage has since expanded to software
design patterns [9] (particularly for object-oriented software
engineering). Recent research provides a number of modelling
patterns for SoS architectures [10]. These were described using
a structured approach that is underpinned by an “architectural
framework” known as the CAFF [11]. The CAFF provides a
consistent way of describing both enabling patterns (“patterns
whose use enables a number of systems engineering appli-
cations” [10]) and architectural frameworks (which “provide
guidance on information sets, or views, that may be used to
present architectural information in a standard way” [12]).
This paper builds on two main areas of background work –
the Contract Pattern [7] and the Fault Modelling Architectural
Framework (FMAF) [13], both of which have been developed
using the CAFF. These are described in more depth in Sec-
tions II-A and II-B respectively.
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Both the Contract Pattern and the FMAF are defined and
demonstrated using SysML [14]. They are, however, notation
agnostic and several notations have been developed for defin-
ing system architectures1. We use SysML in our work and
in this paper primarily due to its increased use in industry.
The profiling features of SysML allow us to extend the base
notation with the required concepts for the relevant domain.
A. Contracts for SoS
We have previously defined the Contract Pattern; a mod-
elling pattern for defining contracts in SoSs [7]. The Contract
Pattern is considered an enabling pattern in relation to our
previous work on modelling patterns [10] – it may be applied
in many different domains and across different architectural
patterns, for example service-oriented architecture, centralised
etc.
The Contract Pattern enables the analysis of emergent
behaviours of an SoS, through the modelling of the internal
behaviours of CSs. The pattern allows a modeller to define
this behaviour in such a way as not to over-constrain the CS
implementations. This limited internal behaviour is considered
a contract. A CS implementation is expected to conform to
one or more contracts.
The Contract Pattern comprises several related viewpoints,
defining: (i) the contracts of the SoS; (ii) the conformance
of the CSs to the contracts; (iii) the connections between the
ports governed by contracts; (iv) the contract definitions; and
(v) the protocols constraining the behaviour of the contract.
The viewpoints of the Contract Pattern are identified in Table I
and are described in more detail in [7]. They assume the use
of the Interface Pattern, as defined in [10], when considering
the connections between the ports and interfaces governed by
contracts.
We propose that contracts defined using the Contract Pat-
tern may be translated to the Compass Modelling Language
(CML): a formal modelling language designed for SoSs [15].
Conformance relationships identified between CSs and con-
tracts may be checked in terms of CML trace refinement. Some
technical challenges relating to this are discussed in [7].
B. Fault Modelling in SoS
In our previous work we developed a Fault Modelling
Architectural Framework (FMAF) for designing fault-tolerant
SoSs [16], [13], [17] and demonstrated how fault-tolerant
properties of such models could be verified [18]2. The FMAF
defines a set of viewpoints that prompts an SoS developer to
consider the impact of faults at the early stages of design,
resulting in a coherent set of views that aid the stakeholders
of the SoS to understand its erroneous and recovery behaviour.
The FMAF has been developed with respect to established
dependability concepts [19]. An SoS failure [13] is defined as
a deviation of the service provided by the SoS from expected
(correct) behaviour. An error is defined as the part of the
1In [15] we survey this area more comprehensively, with particular emphasis
on the support for the rigorous definition of interface specification.
2The FMAF is considered an architectural framework, rather than a pattern,
as it is of a larger scale than a pattern, and is designed to cover the full
functionality of an SoS.
SoS state that can lead to its subsequent service failure. The
adjudged or hypothesised cause of an error is called a fault
and (in keeping with our chosen nomenclature) a failure of a
CS can cause a fault of the SoS.
The set of viewpoints prescribed by the FMAF provide
an approach for defining: (i) faults, errors and failures of
SoSs; (ii) relationships between faults, errors and failures and
CSs; (iii) structural designs that enable fault tolerance; (iv) the
behaviour of the SoS in the presence of errors; and (v) the
recovery behaviour provided by CSs. For further details of
these viewpoints, see [17].
III. RELATED WORK
A common theme of both the work on contracts and the
work on fault modelling is the value of precision in the
definition of interfaces. The SysML language allows basic
operation signatures to be defined at interfaces, and pre- and
postconditions, though these are rarely used in practice. The
Design by Contract (DbC) software engineering technique [20]
is built upon to constrain operations in the contract and
interface definitions. DbC has been used in several other areas
including software engineering design patterns [21] and in
service-based components [22]. Another approach to contract
design has been proposed in [23]. There contracts specify goals
and requirements of an SoS, and are given an LTL semantics.
Previous work has considered: nonfunctional properties and
DbC in architectural interfaces [24]; how interfaces in SysML
can be translated into a formal notation (CML) [15]; and
a method of extending SysML interface descriptions with a
contractual pattern [6]. The current research builds on this
previous work.
Kopetz identifies a variety of potential issues and design
principles for the control of cognitive complexity of SoSs [2].
Relied Upon Message Interfaces (RUMIs), similar to the no-
tion of architectural interfaces, are used to specify the exchange
of messages between CSs in terms of their “syntax, semantics
and temporal behaviour” [2]. Our approach aims to avoid the
situation where there are “multiple different semantic specifi-
cations of the same RUMI” [2] (one for each CS involved) by
providing a standard approach for defining the behaviour of
CSs through contract specifications. By providing a notation
to define faults and recovery within the contracts pattern we
provide support for the identified need to consider “fault
containment and error propagation when defining RUMIs” [2].
These are many examples of architecting fault-tolerant
systems, however to the best of our knowledge this is limited
to the systems level and not in the field of SoS engineering.
Relevant work includes: the Error Model Annex for AADL that
allows architectural modelling of dependability features [25];
the use of UML for modelling erroneous behaviour in em-
bedded systems [26], [27]; and modelling using SysML for
dependable complex physical systems [28] and to verify the
safety requirements in the design of embedded safety-critical
control systems [29].
IV. MODELLING FAULTS IN CONTRACT DESCRIPTIONS
Bang & Olufsen (B&O) develop home Audio Visual (AV)
networks in which several devices cooperate to provide a seam-
less experience for the user. The AV network exhibits many
properties typical of an SoS [1], [5]; for example, the devices
(CSs) are heterogeneous, with (potentially) a wide variation
in autonomy. The CSs may include non-B&O products not
fully under the control of the SoS. They may be capable of
operating independently in a stand-alone mode. Although not
distributed widely, the fact that CSs are not co-located offers
the possibility of certain emergent behaviours, such as sound
which “follows” the listener round the home. Evolution may
be present in the AV SoS as a result of software or firmware
upgrades.
In order for the CSs to cooperate effectively they need to
establish a single leader to coordinate the SoS. The leader is
established through an election process, which involves a series
of messages being exchanged between the devices according
to a predefined algorithm. For the purposes of this illustrative
example we focus on the election functionality of the SoS.
To this end, for each AV Device we define several contracts
including the Leader Election Device (LE Device) contract,
which specifies the behaviour of the election functionality of
an AV Device. The composition of contracts making up the
SoS is shown in Figure 1.
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Fig. 1. Contractual SoS Definition View of the AV SoS
The SoS Leader Election protocol [6], [7] also requires a
CS for transmitting messages – the behaviour of such a CS
is defined in the Transport Layer (TL) contract. The reliable
transmission of messages is a key aspect of the election.
For example, if messages to and from one CS are dropped
then that CS may choose to elect a different leader than the
rest of the SoS, resulting in an inconsistent AV experience.
As the network responsible for transmitting messages is an
independent part of the SoS, only limited guarantees of its
reliability can be made. Therefore it is important to build
fault tolerance into the transmission of messages to tolerate
TL failures.
Figure 2 shows the state-machine of a well-behaved TL
(we call the behaviour of a CS/SoS in the absence of faults its
nominal behaviour). The TL maintains a queue of messages in
transit. When initialised, an LE Device may send a message
to the TL (LE SendMsgs), in which case the TL enters the
Reader state. The received message is packaged up for the TL
queue (by the operation createMessage), added to the queue,
and the Reader state is exited. If the queue is not empty the TL
can enter the Writer state, in which a message is taken from
the queue (operation getNext) and the TL attempts to deliver
it to its destination. The Reader state is exited when either the
delivery is successful, or it times out.
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Fig. 2. Contract Protocol View for the Transport Layer
In this case study, we may consider the role of the SoS
integrator, and thus observe that the TL in fact exhibits erro-
neous behaviour. The Faulty TL is depicted in Figure 3. The
Reader state is identical, but the Writer includes an erroneous
transition dropMessage (stereotyped as an 〈〈error〉〉) that drops
the message from the Ready to read from queue state. This
Faulty TL roughly corresponds to UDP in that no guarantees
can be made over the delivery of messages.
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Fig. 3. Contract Protocol View for the Faulty Transport Layer
In this paper we define the behaviour of a wrapper contract
that can sit between an LE Device and the TL in order to
tolerate transient3 faults in the TL as depicted in Figure 3.
The use of a wrapper contract to ensure the local depend-
ability of a pre-existing contract is a technique advocated by
Romanovsky [30].
Figure 4 shows the new contractual SoS and the composi-
tion of the contracts in the SoS.
Here, there is a single contract describing the behaviour
of the Faulty Transport Layer, and multiple copies of the AV
3A fault is transient if its “presence is bounded in time” [19]. Note that
we cannot tolerate permanent TL faults (whose presence are “continuous in
time” [19]) as these are indistinguishable from an LE Device leaving the SoS
(which is part of the nominal behaviour of the SoS).
Device contract, which is in turn made up of three contracts,
Streaming Device, Browsing Device and a Fault-Tolerant LE
Device contract adapted from the original LE Device contract
in Figure 1 to compensate for the faults exhibited by the TL.
The adaption is to compose the basic LE Device contract with
a set of LE Wrappers to create the Fault-Tolerant LE Device
contract.
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Fig. 4. Contractual SoS Definition View of the Fault-Tolerant AV SoS
The Fault Modelling Contract View in Figure 5 is an instan-
tiation of a new viewpoint, extending the Contract Pattern. The
central three blocks are stereotyped as Fault, Error and Failure,
nomenclature standardised in [19] and used in the FMAF.
Recall, as described in Section II-B that a failure of a CS can
cause a fault of the SoS. Each has a textual description. The
Drop Message error and Message Loss failures are artefacts
at the CS-level in the Faulty Transport Layer. Based upon
the dependability concepts used in the FMAF, the CS-level
Message Loss failure is considered to cause the Unreliable
Message Transmission fault at the SoS-level. This fault, located
in the AV Contractual SoS, affects the LE Device contract, and
is mitigated by the LE Wrapper contract.
The purpose of the LE Wrapper contract is to acknowledge
receipt of messages destined for the LE Device contract and to
listen for acknowledgments to messages that it has sent. The
Contract Definition View in Figure 6 gives the state, operations
and invariants of the LE Wrapper. Each Fault-Tolerant LE
Device consists of an LE Device and a wrapper for every other
LE Device with which it communicates. The contract for LE
Wrapper is therefore parameterised by myId (the identity of
the “owning” LE Device) and yrId (the identity of the receiving
LE Device.) The snd pl value holds the payload that is in the
process of being sent at a given time. The figure shows an
extension made to the Contract Pattern – the inclusion of a
mitigates tag, which explicitly records that the LE Wrapper
contract mitigates the Unreliable Message Transmission SoS-
level fault, as identified in Figure 5.
The required behaviour of the LE Wrapper contract is spec-
ified in Figure 7. Wrapper Send and Wrapper Rec are parallel
 
«Fault Modelling Contract View»
fmcv AV SoS [Unreliable Message Transmission]
«block»
«Contract»
Faulty Transport Layer
«block»
«Contract»
LE Wrapper
«block»
«Contract»
LE Device
«block»
«Error»
«Error»
errorDesc = Message lost from queue.
Corresponds to dropMessage event
on Faulty Transport Layer contract
abstractionLevel = CS
Drop Message
«block»
«Failure»
«Failure»
failureDesc = Transport Layer does
not deliver all messages
abstractionLevel = CS
Message Loss
«block»
«Fault»
«Fault»
faultDesc = The Transport Layer
constituent system may not send
all messages successfully
abstractionLevel = SoS
Unreliable Message
Transmission
«block»
«Contractual SoS»
AV Contractual SoS
«exhibitedBy»
«mitigatedBy»
«affects»
«locatedIn»
«causes»«causes»
«locatedIn»
A CS failure 
corresponds to an 
SoS fault
Mitigates unreliable transport layer by 
requiring acknowledgements and 
resending messages. Only mitigates 
intermittent message loss.
Fig. 5. The Fault Modelling Contract View for the Unreliable Message
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Fig. 6. The Contract Definition View of the LE Wrapper
states. Wrapper Send passes on messages from the owning LE
Device to the TL. It begins by storing the message, in case
it needs to be resent, then sends it. If an acknowledgment is
received (within the time limit wrapper timeout) the wrapper
goes back to its initial state, otherwise it tries once again to
resend the stored message. This resend only happens once;
even if an acknowledgment is not received after the second
attempt, the wrapper does not attempt to resend4. Wrapper
Rec receives and acknowledges incoming messages from the
TL and passes them on to the LE Device5.
In summary, Table I identifies those viewpoints of the
Contract Pattern which have been extended to include fault
modelling concepts (extensions are shown in italics) and the
additional Fault Modelling Contract Viewpoint presented in
this paper.
4The number of retries can be trivially increased, but the AV SoS needs to
be tolerant to devices exiting the SoS at any time, therefore the LE Wrapper
should not retry to send the message indefinitely. The exact choice on the
number of retries is a trade-off between maintaining consistency within the
SoS in the presence of faults and reducing unnecessary traffic on the TL.
5This LE Wrapper is therefore similar to, but considerably simpler than,
protocols for making UDP reliable such as Automatic Repeat Request (ARQ)
and Pragmatic General Multicast (PGM).
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TABLE I. INFORMAL DESCRIPTION OF THE EXTENDED CONTRACT
PATTERN VIEWPOINTS
Existing Viewpoints
Name Purpose of Viewpoint
Contractual SoS Identifies the contracts which comprise the
Definition Viewpoint Contractual SoS.
Contract Conformance Denotes the contracts to which the SoS constituent
Viewpoint systems conform.
Contract Connections Shows connections and interfaces between contracts
Viewpoint of the Contractual SoS.
Contract Definition Defines the operations, state variables and
Viewpoint state invariants for a single contract.
Failure modes and mitigated faults added.
Contract Protocol Protocol specification of a contract.
Viewpoint Erroneous transitions added and fault-tolerant
protocols supported.
New Viewpoint
Name Purpose of Viewpoint
Fault Modelling Associates faults, errors and failures with
Contract Viewpoint contracts. Includes exhibited by, mitigated
by and affected by relationships.
V. RELATIONSHIP WITH FMAF
As described in Section II, the Contract Pattern and FMAF
are defined using a common framework. We may therefore
make extensions (as is done with the extended Contract Pattern
in this paper) and also combine them using their ontologies to
identify shared modelling elements and relationships. In this
section, we briefly consider the areas in which the Contract
Pattern and FMAF overlap and consider one possible area in
which there is a difference in the proposed modelling approach.
The extended Contract Pattern and the FMAF can be used
in combination to provide a consistent and complementary set
of viewpoints of an SoS model. Both aspects of the model
should have a consistent understanding of the faults, errors
and failures of the SoS. To achieve this we recommend that a
single definition of these is used for both sets of viewpoints,
by making use of the FMAF Fault/Error/Failure Definition
Viewpoint (FEFDV) [13] within the extended Contract Pattern.
The FEFDV provides details of all of the relevant faults, errors
and failures of the SoS and identifies any relationships that
exist between them. The Fault Modelling Contract View in
Figure 5, must therefore be consistent with the FEFDV.
The structural aspects of the patterns are complementary –
where the FMAF supports definition of the composition and
connections of CSs, the extended Contract Pattern does the
same for contracts. The Contract Conformance Viewpoint of
the extended Contract Pattern relates the CSs to the contracts
and can thus be used as a basis for checking the consistency
of these complementary aspects of the model.
The approaches to modelling behaviour in the FMAF and
in the extended Contract Pattern differ quite considerably.
Whilst the FMAF uses sequence diagrams and activity di-
agrams to focus on processes of the SoS and interactions
between CSs, the extended Contract Pattern uses state ma-
chines to target the states and transitions of single CSs (via the
definition of the contract protocols they are required to adhere
to). These two complementary approaches can be effectively
used side by side to provide a more complete treatment of the
behaviour of the SoS.
Finally, traceability links could be used as a semi-formal
way (see for example [13]) of relating the complementary
aspects of the extended Contract Pattern and the FMAF – the
implementation of this is the subject of further research.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have highlighted the crucial need to ex-
amine the impact of faults when defining contracts for CSs, in
order to create a fault-tolerant SoS. Using an Audio Visual SoS
case study we have illustrated how the previously developed
Contract Pattern [6] can be extended to include consideration
for faults and fault tolerance. Extending the Contract Pattern in
this way has been shown to be complementary to our previous
efforts in defining an architectural framework (the FMAF [13])
for incorporating faults at the architectural design phase of
creating an SoS.
Fault modelling has been an active area of research for
some time and there is a rich taxonomy of fault types, as
well as a rich set of “countermeasures” (fault tolerance and
recovery, mitigation, etc) [19]. In this paper we have used a
single fault and recovery mechanism in order to investigate
the feasibility of integration of the Contract Pattern and the
FMAF. A natural continuation of this work is to extend the
types of faults and countermeasures that we cover, as well as
considering the interaction of multiple faults. Our preliminary
results may also be strengthened by their application to a wider
range of SoSs, leading to a more complete set of extensions
to the Contract Pattern for the purpose of modelling faults and
fault tolerance within SoSs.
The integration of the extended Contract Pattern with the
FMAF also deserves a more thorough treatment, and we
consider two main directions: the first of which relates to
the first piece of future work mentioned earlier – identifying
new viewpoints that may be needed to support a wider variety
of faults and countermeasures, along with new relationships
between such viewpoints and the FMAF; and the second is
the recording of traceability links (as discussed in Section V)
between elements of the extended Contract Pattern and ele-
ments of the FMAF (building upon the work in [13]).
Further types of extension to the Contract Pattern could
be envisaged. Ongoing work on static fault analysis of an
SoS investigates marking up structural architectural models
with certain fault information. Analysis can then be carried
out using an industrial fault analysis tool. It seems natural to
incorporate the mark-up language within the extended Contract
Pattern.
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